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INTRODUCTION
This is an essay about common law decision-making, with an emphasis
on the value of consistency as it relates to claims about the legitimacy of
judicial lawmaking. The legitimacy of judicial lawmaking is ever an issue,
particularly, of course, in the cases at the margins—those instances in which
precedent points the court in no obviously correct direction, a choice must be
made between plausible alternative paths, and “a decision one way or the
other,” as Benjamin Cardozo observed, “will count for the future, will
advance or retard, sometimes much, sometimes little, the development of the
law.”1
*

Professor of Law, New England School of Law. I served as a law clerk to Associate
Justice William F. Batchelder of the New Hampshire Supreme Court from August 1995 until
Justice Batchelder’s retirement; I continued to serve as a law clerk to Justice Batchelder’s
successor, John T. Broderick, Jr., until August 1997. Thanks are due to my colleague Jordy
Singer, for his very helpful comments and suggestions; and to Elisabeth Baker, for her
excellent research assistance.
1. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 165 (1921). As Israeli
Supreme Court Chief Justice Aharon Barak has noted, these are the cases in which “judges
must consider whether it is appropriate to change the judicial precedent itself, by expanding or
restricting the existing case law or overturning an old precedent.” AHARON BARAK, THE
JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 10 (2006).

1

2

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 12, No. 1

These are often the cases in which a court must address what
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Chief Justice Edward F. Hennessey
called “[t]he most acute of all tensions”—namely, “the confrontation . . .
between objectivity and the judge’s personal philosophy.”2 The hope is that,
when faced with the opportunity to create or reject precedent, the court will
show due respect for the value of consistency—for the value that inheres in a
predictable and logical approach to the interpretation, application,
articulation, and extrapolation of legal rules. Consistency suggests that
judicial decision-making is based upon principle rather than passion, and its
presence or absence accordingly contributes to the public’s view of the
legitimacy of particular instances of judicial lawmaking.3
In exploring the contribution of consistency to the legitimacy of judicial
lawmaking, my focus is on two discrete cases from the New Hampshire
Supreme Court—Bonte v. Bonte4 and Aranson v. Schroeder5—in which one
justice—William F. Batchelder—played a significant role, joining the dissent
in the first and writing for the majority in the second. Each case concerned
the question whether the court should, for the first time, recognize a
particular cause of action in tort. In the former case, Justice Batchelder did
not approve a new cause of action; in the latter, he did. What I seek to
examine here is whether these cases provide an example of the kind of
inconsistency that necessarily undermines legitimacy, or whether a principled
distinction between the decisions suggests an interpretive approach which
could be usefully applied in other cases in which litigants seek recognition of
novel causes of action.
I have chosen these particular cases, and this particular justice,
deliberately. After graduation from law school and a trial court clerkship, I
clerked for Justice Batchelder, and so I have some sense of how these
decisions came to be. It follows that my analysis here is in no way empirical.
To the contrary, this is a fairly impressionistic account of two discrete
instances of common law decision-making and how one court—how one
judge—navigated the critical questions presented in those instances, and
2. EDWARD F. HENNESSEY, JUDGES MAKING LAW 63 (1994). As David A. Strauss put it:
“There is an old question: does a judge decide how a case will come out, and then find a
justification in the law? Or does the judge approach the case with no strong prior inclination
and follow the legal materials where they lead?” David A. Strauss, What Were They
Thinking?, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 184 (Cass R. Sunstein &
Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001).
3. Cf. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (plurality opinion) (noting that, while
“[l]aws promulgated by the Legislative Branch can be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc,” the
law as declared by the courts ought to be “principled, rational, and based upon reasoned
distinctions”).
4. 616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992).
5. 671 A.2d 1023 (N.H. 1995).
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what that may say more generally about the value of consistency in common
law decision-making. This essay is microhistorical in the sense that it may
reveal “in fine-grained detail how larger processes operate, how [a] case
serves as a useful hypothesis for exploring other cases.”6
At the same time, attorneys who in some future case will be making
arguments about whether a new cause of action should be adopted (or
rejected) would be paying attention to the same concerns at play in the two
cases that I discuss herein—that is, to the various factors a court considers in
determining whether to adopt a new cause of action. In other words, it is
likely that the attorneys seeking to press the claim for recognition of a new
cause of action, or to oppose it, would be looking at cases like Bonte and
Aranson and thinking about them in similar ways, with an eye toward
extracting some guidance about how a court might proceed going forward.
It may be helpful at this point to have some sense of Justice Batchelder
and his tenure on the New Hampshire Supreme Court. Born in Plymouth,
New Hampshire, the judge had served in the U.S. Navy in World War II and
returned to earn degrees from the University of New Hampshire and Boston
University Law School. 7 He worked in private practice until Governor
Walter Peterson appointed him to the Superior Court in 1970.8 Governor
Hugh Gallen appointed him eleven years later to the Supreme Court, from
which he stepped down in November 1995.9
By reputation Justice Batchelder was compared, with good reason, to
United States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan.10 Like Brennan,
Batchelder had an abiding interest in the role of the judge as protector of
individual rights and liberties.11 In a 1977 Harvard Law Review article,
Justice Brennan urged state courts to view their own constitutions as a source
of rights and liberties whose protections might extend “beyond those
6. See John Walton, James F. Brooks & Christopher R. N. DeCorse, Introduction to
SMALL WORLDS: METHODS, MEANING & NARRATIVE IN MICROHISTORY 5 (John Walton, James
F. Brooks & Christopher R. N. DeCorse eds., 2008) (describing microhistorical studies “in the
best of circumstances”); cf. Jill Lepore, Historians Who Love Too Much: Reflections on
Microhistory and Biography, 88 AM. J. HIST. 129, 133 (2001) (describing “microhistory” as
founded on the assumption that, “however singular a person’s life may be, the value of
examining it lies not in its uniqueness, but in its exemplariness, in how that individual’s life
serves as an allegory for broader issues affecting the culture as a whole”).
7. Walter L. Murphy, Tribute to Justice William F. Batchelder, 37 N.H.B.J. 7, 7 (1996).
8. Id.
9. Id. I clerked for Justice Batchelder in the last few months of his tenure on the New
Hampshire Supreme Court. In his letter offering me the job, he suggested that his current
clerks wanted to get together with me for lunch and, he wrote, “[s]o you will be completely at
ease during the luncheon, all they want to do is to look you over and size you up.” Letter from
William F. Batchelder to author (May 17, 1994) (on file with author).
10. See Murphy, supra note 7, at 8.
11. See id.
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required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.”12 The New
Hampshire Supreme Court, and Justice Batchelder in particular, took a
similar view and soon emerged at the vanguard of the phenomenon known as
the “new judicial federalism,”13 the move toward resolving individual rights
and liberties issues under the state constitutional counterparts to the
protections contained in the federal Bill of Rights. 14 That the New
Hampshire Constitution and its Declaration of Rights were important to
Justice Batchelder was plain to anyone who studied his decisions involving
individual rights, equal protection, and criminal procedure.15
Indeed, in the end I suggest that it may well be constitutional
commitments to securing particular individual rights and liberties—both state
and federal—that figure most critically in distinguishing between the claim
to a remedy that Justice Batchelder rejected in Bonte, on the one hand, and
accepted in Aranson, on the other. While neither case was overtly about the
dimensions of a particular constitutional right, in each instance specific
constitutional commitments cast discrete shadows on the arguments for and
against the recognition of a new cause of action. The nature and depth of
these shadows may provide some clue as to how we can reconcile two
seemingly disparate outcomes.
I begin, in Part I, by detailing the two decisions. Next, in Part II, I
discuss the methods of common law decision-making developed by
Benjamin Cardozo in his classic work, The Nature of the Judicial Process,16
and how those methods may be applied to the decisions of Justice Batchelder
in Bonte and Aranson. Here, I discuss the extent to which Justice
Batchelder’s differing responses to the call to create a new common law
cause of action cannot be fully explained by applying Cardozo’s framework.
Finally, in Part III, I argue that, when we account for the effect of certain
state constitutional individual rights commitments on the plaintiffs’ claims, a
12. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
13. See, e.g., State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 352 (N.H. 1983) (addressing the state
constitutional claim independently and relying upon federal authority only for the guidance it
might provide).
14. See John Kincaid, Foreword: The New Federalism Context of the New Judicial
Federalism, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 913, 913 n.1 (1995) (defining the new judicial federalism as
state high court decision-making “based upon provisions of state constitutions that have served
either as independent and adequate bases, or as the only bases, for ruling on questions of
individual rights and liberties”). As Robert Williams has pointed out, the “new” judicial
federalism is no longer so very new. See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 113–14 (2009).
15. See Joanne Green, Justice William F. Batchelder: In His Own Words, 37 N.H.B.J. 54,
54 (1996) (noting that Justice Batchelder’s interest in “individual rights and personal dignity”
came “from [his] heart”).
16. Cardozo, supra note 1.
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consistency in approach emerges between Justice Batchelder’s positions in
Bonte and Aranson—a consistency that should alleviate some fears about
decision-making based upon a “judge’s personal philosophy.”17
I. THE DECISIONS
A. Bonte v. Bonte
In Bonte v. Bonte,18 the New Hampshire Supreme Court addressed the
question “whether a child born alive can maintain a cause of action in tort
against his or her mother for the mother’s tortious conduct that caused
prenatal injury.”19 Hit by a car when she was seven months pregnant, the
defendant, Sharon Bonte, sustained serious injuries that required the baby to
be delivered by emergency caesarean section. 20 Stephanie Bonte—the
plaintiff—was born with brain damage that would require she receive
“medical and supervisory care” for the rest of her life.21 Represented by her
father, the plaintiff sought recovery for negligence, claiming the defendant
“fail[ed] to use reasonable care in crossing the street and fail[ed] to use a
designated crosswalk.”22 The plaintiff appealed from a judgment for the
defendant on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.23
The court, with Justice Steven Thayer writing for the majority, first
addressed the question “whether a child born alive may maintain a cause of
action for injuries sustained while the child was in utero.”24 The court noted
precedent allowing such actions, so as not to deny children the right to
recover for injuries that would affect them for life simply because they were
not yet born when they sustained the injuries.25 At the same time, precedent
did not define against whom an action could be brought for damages suffered
in utero; nor did it differentiate between injuries sustained by a mother and
those sustained by a child in utero.26
The court next addressed the question “whether [a] child may maintain
an action against his or her mother,” looking at the history of actions by
children against a parent for negligence.27 Historically, New Hampshire
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

HENNESSEY, supra note 2, at 63.
616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992).
Id. at 464.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bonte, 616 A.2d at 464–65.
Id. at 465.
See generally Bennett v. Hymers, 147 A.2d 108 (N.H. 1958).
Bonte, 616 A.2d at 465.
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courts relied upon the doctrine of “parental immunity,” the principle that an
unemancipated minor could not maintain an action against a parent for bodily
injury caused by the parent’s negligence, a doctrine founded in the court’s
commitment to preserve “the repose of families and the best interests of
society.”28 In a case called Levesque v. Levesque,29 the plaintiff filed suit
against his father for injuries sustained when the father negligently operated
the vehicle in which they were riding. The Levesque court noted the wide
availability of car insurance to account for a monetary award in such cases,
but ruled against “creat[ing] a right of action where none would otherwise
exist.”30
Later, in a case called Dean v. Smith,31 the court moved away from the
doctrine of parental immunity and allowed a minor plaintiff to sue his
deceased father’s estate for his father’s negligence in operating the vehicle in
which they were riding. 32 The court again noted that the existence of
insurance should not create a right of action, but this time found that the
presence of insurance should be taken into account when considering
whether an unemancipated child could sue a parent for negligence, because it
would lessen the possibility that an award would “disrupt family harmony”
or greatly affect the family financially.33
The Bonte court then looked at a case called Briere v. Briere, which
abolished the doctrine of parental immunity entirely.34 Again, the issue was
whether unemancipated children could sue their father for injuries sustained
when he negligently operated the vehicle in which they were riding.35 This
time, the court found inadequate the arguments that such immunity would
preserve “family harmony” and not strain the family financially,36 and that
the “prevalence of insurance [could not] be ignored.”37 The court concluded
it would be unfair to deny children “a right commonly enjoyed by all other
individuals,”38 and that it was not consistent to deny this right while allowing
recovery for claims of contract or property rights.39

28. Levesque v. Levesque, 106 A.2d 563 (N.H. 1954), overruled by Briere v. Briere, 224
A.2d 588 (N.H. 1966).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 564.
31. 211 A.2d 410 (N.H. 1965).
32. Id. at 412–13.
33. Id. at 413.
34. Briere, 224 A.2d at 591.
35. Id. at 589.
36. Id. at 590.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 591.
39. Id.
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The Bonte majority tied together these doctrinal threads. It reasoned
that, because children may have a cause of action against their parents for
negligence, and because the court already sanctioned a cause of action for
negligence for injuries sustained in utero, a child may also have a cause of
action against a mother for negligent acts that injure the child in utero.40
The majority rejected the defendant’s argument that such a cause of
action violated public policy, based upon the unique relationship between a
pregnant woman and her unborn child.41 The majority acknowledged the
uniqueness of this relationship but found that it was not sufficient to keep the
court from recognizing a legal duty of a mother to her fetus.42 “If a child has
a cause of action against his or her mother for negligence that occurred after
birth and that caused injury to the child,” the majority concluded, it would be
illogical and contrary to precedent, “to disallow that child’s claim against the
mother for negligent conduct that caused injury to the child months, days or
mere hours before the child’s birth.”43
The majority also rejected the defendant’s assertion that such an action
would “deprive[] women of the right to control their lives during pregnancy
. . . [and] unfairly subject[] them to unlimited liability for unintended and
often unforeseen consequences of every day living.” 44 The majority
concluded that the duty of care required by a pregnant woman toward her
unborn child was no different than that of a third person to the fetus, or of a
mother to a child after the child is born.45
Justice William Johnson, concurring specially, agreed with the dissent’s
emphasis on the unique and sensitive component of the relationship between
a mother and her unborn child and that such cases should be examined in
detail, with a “careful, case-by-case development of the law.”46 Nonetheless,
he concurred in the holding that the breach of a duty in this instance created a
foreseeable harm to the child that should be deemed actionable.47
Chief Justice David Brock and Justice Batchelder jointly dissented. In
their view, the majority did not give sufficient weight to the “privacy and
physical autonomy rights of women” and what its holding would mean “for
all women in th[e] state who are, or may, become pregnant.”48 While the
extension of liability to a mother might follow from the existence of thirdparty liability, the question whether “to subject the day-to-day decisions and
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Bonte, 616 A.2d at 466.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bonte, 616 A.2d at 466 (Johnson, J., concurring specially).
Id. at 467.
Id. (Brock, C.J., and Batchelder, J., dissenting).
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acts of a woman concerning her pregnancy to judicial scrutiny” is not one
properly “to be decided by a mechanical application of logic.”49
Third parties must exercise a particular standard of care in regard to
other persons, and extending this duty to unborn children “does not
significantly restrict the behavior or actions of the defendant beyond the
limitations already imposed.”50 In other words, third parties could “continue
to act much as they did before the cause of action was recognized.”51 But
this is not the case when the same duty is imposed upon the mother: she will
now have to constrain her actions based upon legal standards, where
previously she was guided by her “sense of personal responsibility and
moral, not legal, obligation to her fetus.”52
And, the dissenters continued, there is “no existing legal duty analogous
to this one, which could govern such details of a woman’s life as her diet,
sleep, exercise, sexual activity, work and living environment, and, of course,
nearly every aspect of her health care.”53 Women carry children, after all,
not because it is their fault, but because “it is a fact of life.”54 The standard
of liability created by the majority would compel a court to scrutinize in
every case whether the pregnancy was planned, at what point in the
pregnancy it became known to the woman, and the woman’s financial
situation. 55 “Such after-the-fact judicial scrutiny of the subtle and
complicated factors affecting a women’s pregnancy may make life for
women who are pregnant or who are merely contemplating pregnancy
intolerable.”56
The dissenters recognized a child’s valid interest in being born “free of
negligently inflicted prenatal injuries and his or her right to recover for such
harm,” and the dissenters made clear they were not addressing injuries by the
negligent acts of the mother that “may not directly implicate the unique
relationship between mother and fetus.” 57 Rather, the dissenters were
concerned “that a rule of law attempting to distinguish between acts of the
mother that involve privacy interests and those that may be considered
common torts would result in arbitrary line-drawing resulting in inconsistent
verdicts.”58 Accordingly, “as a matter of both judicial and public policy,”
they would “decline to recognize a cause of action by a child born alive
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Bonte, 616 A.2d at 467.
Id.
Id. at 468 (quotation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bonte, 616 A.2d at 468.
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against his or her mother for the mother’s negligent acts resulting in prenatal
injury.”59
B. Aranson v. Schroeder
Aranson v. Schroeder, 60 decided just three years after Bonte, also
involved the question whether the New Hampshire Supreme Court should
recognize a new cause of action. The case began when the Town of Conway
sued Mark and Kathy Aranson and the Woodland Road Realty Trust (“the
trust”) for allegedly selling a condominium without the legally required
certificate of occupancy.61 Robert Schroeder represented the trust in the suit
brought by the town, but the Aransons sought their own counsel and counterclaimed on the grounds that they were not aware the certificate was required
or that any aspect of the transaction was not legally compliant. They sought
rescission, as well as treble damages.62 The town won its suit against the
Aransons and the trust, and the Aransons prevailed on their claim against the
trust and trustees.63 The trust and the trustees appealed the award and the
New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed.64
The Aransons sought to enforce their judgment in Massachusetts but
had not “collected a farthing”65 from the defendants when they filed a new
action in New Hampshire, asking the Superior Court to “recognize a cause of
action for the tort of malicious defense, define its elements, and determine
whether an attorney’s law firm is also subject to liability.”66 “In effect,” the
court noted, the Aransons—now plaintiffs in this new suit—sought “an
aspect of tort reform, the recognition at common law of a remedy where”
none had existed. 67 The trial court found to be false defendant John
Thompson’s claim that Mr. Aranson had said he checked on the permit and
that everything was “all set”; the court also concluded that defendant
Schroeder falsified a document in support of this allegation, a document
likely created after the Aransons filed their counterclaim.68 The court also
found that the Aransons did not know about the permit requirement until the
town sued them, concluding that the plaintiffs would not have purchased the

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
671 A.2d 1023 (N.H. 1995).
Id. at 1025.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1025.
Id.
Id. at 1026.
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property had the lack of a permit been known to them.69
The Aransons argued for the creation of a new cause of action—a claim
for malicious defense that would be, in essence, a “mirror image of § 674 of
the Restatement (2d),” the already recognized tort of malicious prosecution
or false claim.70 The Aransons maintained the state of the law was unfair, as
it “condemn[ed] false evidence from the plaintiff’s side but arguably
tolerat[ed] it from the defendant’s side.”71 Both forms of misconduct, the
Aransons concluded, “should be condemned, and made the subject of
damages.”72 The lower court did not rule on the Aransons’ claim, instead
transferring the case to the Supreme Court with three questions of law: (1)
Does a cause of action exist against a person who allegedly created false
material evidence while acting as defense counsel in a previous case and,
after withdrawing as counsel, allegedly gave false testimony advancing such
evidence? (2) If so, what are the elements of such a new cause of action? (3)
Does such cause of action also exist against such counsel’s firm?73
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, with Justice Batchelder writing for
the majority, first reviewed the factors it would consider in determining
whether to recognize a new cause of action.74 As an initial matter, there is
the question “whether the interest that the plaintiffs assert should receive any
legal recognition.”75 If it should, the next question is “whether the relief that
the plaintiffs request would be an appropriate way to recognize it.”76 While
conducting this inquiry, the majority acknowledged that it should be mindful
of Part I, article 14 of the New Hampshire Constitution, which provides to
every citizen “a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all
injuries he may receive in his person, property, or character.”77
The majority noted that no new action should be created if an action
already existed that could provide the same remedy.78 In this case, the only
claim available to the plaintiffs, absent the creation of a malicious defense
cause of action, was one for sanctions to attorneys engaged in the improper
conduct.79 But that remedy, the majority continued, would not provide the
Aransons the damages they sought—namely, “consequential and special
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1026.
73. Id. at 1025.
74. See id. at 1026 (quoting Rockhouse Mountain Prop. Owners Ass’n v. Town of
Conway, 503 A.2d 1385, 1387–88 (N.H. 1986)).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XIV).
78. Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1026–27.
79. Id. at 1027.
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damages, costs, interest, attorney’s fees, and enhanced compensatory
damages—the same damages to which they would have been entitled in a
successful suit for malicious prosecution.”80 Asking whether plaintiffs are
“less aggrieved when the groundless claim put forth in the courts is done
defensively rather than affirmatively in asserting a worthless lawsuit,” the
majority concluded they are not, and that the tort of malicious defense should
be adopted.81
The defendants contended that no such action had ever been adopted, but
the majority pointed to cases in South Carolina and California in which
courts found some form of damages for a false defense to be appropriate.82
As well, the majority recognized the anxiety and uncertainty that
accompanies litigation.83 “Here,” the majority stated, though the Aransons
“prevailed in their lawsuit, they did so at a price—in time, money, and
uncertainty—that was substantially exacerbated by the alleged actions of
Schroeder. If a factual predicate exists to support liability and a measure of
the damages thus exacerbated, the plaintiffs are entitled to a remedy to that
extent.”84 In other words, “upon proving malicious defense, the aggrieved
party is entitled to the same damages as are recoverable in a malicious
prosecution claim.”85
At the same time, the majority made clear that “the mere existence of a
remedy for malicious defense will not serve as a license for its abuse.”86
Malicious defense, the majority reasoned, should be a “limited cause of
action that will lie only in discrete circumstances.”87 The court indicated it
would not tolerate such claims as a means by which plaintiffs could seek to
interfere with procedure or to intimidate, to limit discovery, or as a recourse
when they are “merely dissatisfied with a monetary judgment.”88
Next, the majority addressed the elements of a malicious defense claim.
Here, it adopted a standard with elements that “essentially mirror those
required to prove the tort of malicious prosecution”:89

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing Cisson v. Pickens, 186 S.E.2d 822, 825 (S.C. 1972); Bertero v. Nat’l Gen.
Corp., 529 P.2d 608, 616 (Cal. 1975)).
83. See id. at 1028 (stating that litigation is a “disturbing influence” and causes
“uncertainty”).
84. Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1028.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1029.
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One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation,
or procurement of the defense of a civil proceeding is subject
to liability for all harm proximately caused, including
reasonable attorneys’ fees, if[:]
(a) he or she acts without probable cause, i.e., without any
credible basis in fact and such action is not warranted by
existing law or established equitable principles or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law,
(b) with knowledge or notice of the lack of merit in such
actions,
(c) primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the
proper adjudication of the claim and defense thereto, such as
to harass, annoy or injure, or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation,
(d) the previous proceedings are terminated in favor of the
party bringing the malicious defense action, and
(e) injury or damage is sustained.90
The majority particularly noted the importance of the termination of
previous proceedings in favor of the party asserting the malicious defense
claim.91 As in the context of a malicious prosecution claim, this requirement
serves to avoid inconsistent verdicts and unnecessary litigation; a plaintiff
who loses in the original action should be barred from instituting a malicious
defense claim because a judgment in favor of the defendant demonstrates that
he acted with probable cause—a malicious defense claim should not be a
means by which plaintiffs can reopen judgments.92
Justice Thayer dissented, in the belief that the majority’s holding was
“unwise as a matter of policy.”93 Justice Thayer argued that the defendants
were not claiming the Aransons had no cause of action, but that creating a
90. Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1028–29 (quoting Jonathan K. Van Patten & Robert E. Willard,
The Limits of Advocacy: A Proposal for the Tort of Malicious Defense in Civil Litigation, 35
HASTINGS L.J. 891, 933–34 (1984)).
91. See id. at 1029 (explaining the importance of the termination requirement and finding
“no reason why” it should not “equally appl[y]” to a malicious defense claim).
92. Id. The court did not address the third transferred question for lack of evidence on the
record, leaving that determination for the trial court.
93. Id. at 1031 (Thayer, J., dissenting).
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“separate cause of action for malicious defense [was not] an appropriate
recognition of this interest.”94 He argued that a separate action was not
appropriate for two reasons: first, because the Aransons already had
“adequate remedies” available to them; and, second, because of the
significant differences between a malicious claim and a malicious defense,
which justified “the existing discrepancy in remedies.”95
As to the first reason, Thayer enumerated the existing remedies
available to the Aransons, including an award of attorney’s fees and
sanctions for related “out-of-pocket expenses,” as well as “statutory costs,”
which he believed would be sufficient compensation for a plaintiff faced with
a false defense. 96 Thayer also pointed to the possibility of holding the
defendant’s attorney “personally liable for counsel fees,”97 citing the New
Hampshire Supreme Court’s decision in Keenan v. Fearon, in which the
court held the plaintiff’s lawyer liable for the defendant’s attorney’s fees
after filing an appeal without the plaintiff’s consent.98 In addition, Thayer
noted the opportunity for the court to set aside a “fraudulently obtained
judgment.”99 Finally, Thayer discussed “the possibility of criminal sanctions
where perjury is part of the malicious defense,” as well as “the threat of
professional disciplinary proceedings,” though he acknowledged that neither
of these actions would provide direct relief to plaintiffs.100
While Justice Thayer did not dispute that a disparity exists between the
potential recovery for malicious prosecution and for malicious defense,101 he
justified that disparity by the differing injuries. While defendants are
unwillingly brought into court, plaintiffs willingly initiate suits; thus,
[u]nlike the defendant targeted by a malicious prosecution,
the plaintiff who encounters a malicious defense voluntarily
entered the judicial system and must be held to accept, to
some degree, the costs and risks of litigation. When this
plaintiff ultimately prevails in the action, at best only a
portion of the plaintiff’s litigation costs and damages can be
attributed to the malicious defense.102

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1031.
Id.
Id. (citing Keenan v. Fearon, 543 A.2d 1379, 1383 (N.H. 1988)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1032.
Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1032.
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Further, Justice Thayer pointed to the possibility of increased and
unwarranted litigation,103 arguing that plaintiffs dissatisfied with the amount
of a judgment may use the action to “augment their recovery,” and if a
defendant is “judgment-proof,” plaintiffs might use the action to recover
from the defendant’s lawyers instead.104 Thayer also noted the possibility
that the tort could undermine a defendant’s ability to mount a “vigorous
defense” in fear that such an effort would later be deemed “malicious.”105
Such an action, moreover, would be inconsistent with the rule that
“statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely
privileged from civil actions, provided they are pertinent to the subject of the
proceeding,”106 and Thayer noted that even when the defendant “inject[ed]
. . . privileged material itself into the case,” a waiver of confidentiality might
have a detrimental effect on attorney-client privilege.107 He also observed
that in most cases, it would be a plaintiff claiming the defendant was liable
for part or all of their attorney’s fees, which would inevitably require a
determination as to the portion of the fees tied to the malicious defense and a
“highly invasive review of documents normally protected by the attorneyclient privilege.”108 Concluding that the addition of a cause of action for
malicious defense to New Hampshire’s common law was undesirable, Justice
Thayer noted that not only had no other jurisdiction in the country
recognized such an action, but courts in other jurisdictions had explicitly
rejected it.109
C. Are Justice Batchelder’s Positions in Bonte and Aranson Consistent?
To review: both Bonte and Aranson involved arguments about a novel
cause of action: in Bonte, the plaintiff sought relief by imposing liability on
his mother for her negligent actions when he was in utero; in Aranson, the
plaintiffs sought relief by imposing liability on opposing counsel in a
previous case for his actions in that litigation. So characterized, the claims in
these cases generally appear similar, each in its way seeking, in the words of
the state constitutional guarantee, “a certain remedy . . . for . . . injuries.”110
And in this light, Justice Batchelder’s positions in each appear to be in direct
opposition, as he voted to deny Bonte an opportunity to seek relief and
103. See id. (stating that the action could motivate future litigation in a way previously not
recognized).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1032–33.
108. Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1033.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1026 (quoting N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XIV).
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approved the Aransons’ bid to do the same.
But I want to argue here that, in fact, Justice Batchelder acted
consistently in each case. If judicial legitimacy is premised to some extent
upon the value of consistency, then it behooves us to determine whether
Justice Batchelder got it right when he reached different results in a pair of
cases in which the court was asked to recognize a new common law cause of
action. These are the instances, as Chief Justice Hennessey recognized, in
which the third branch is going about the business of making law—instances,
in other words, when we ought to pay close attention to whether judges are
making decisions based upon their personal philosophies, rather than upon
objectively verifiable principles.111
To show why I believe Justice Batchelder’s positions are consistent in
Bonte and Aranson requires a framework for charting the possible
approaches to common law decision-making. The classic understanding of
the way in which state judges go about their business comes from Benjamin
Cardozo and his lectures on the judicial process.112 In the next Part, I review
Cardozo’s framework and use it to evaluate Justice Batchelder’s decisions in
Bonte and Aranson to determine whether they are consistent despite their
different outcomes.
II. BONTE, ARANSON, AND THE METHODS OF COMMON LAW
DECISION-MAKING
In The Nature of the Judicial Process, Benjamin Cardozo sought to shed
light on the principles that guide judicial discretion.113 The judge, he argued,
“must first extract from the precedents the underlying principle, the ratio
decidendi; he must then determine the path or direction along which the
principle is to move and develop, if it is not to whither and die.”114 Even
after a principle has been identified, “[t]he problem remains to fix the bounds
and the tendencies of development and growth, to set the directive force in
motion along the right path at the parting of the ways.”115
In addressing this problem, Cardozo identified four interpretive avenues
available to a judge: (1) the path of logic—what Cardozo called “the rule of
analogy or the method of philosophy”; (2) the path of historical development,
what he called “the method of evolution”; (3) the path of the customs of the
community, which he called “the method of tradition”; and (4) the path of
111. See HENNESSEY, supra note 2, at 2–3 (stating common law decision-making is one of
the areas in which “the legitimacy of the court is problematic”).
112. See generally Cardozo, supra note 1.
113. See id. at 19.
114. Id. at 28.
115. Id. at 30.
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justice, morals and social welfare, which he called “the method of
sociology.”116 In what follows, I explore each of these alternatives and seek
to determine which, if any, support the consistency of Justice Batchelder’s
decisions in Bonte and Aranson.
A. The Method of Philosophy
The method of philosophy, Cardozo explained, enjoys “the primacy that
comes from natural and orderly and logical succession.”117 It of course “will
not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and
the opposite way between another,”118 he wrote, and logic ought to control if
“the affairs of men are to be governed with the serene and impartial
uniformity which is of the essence of the idea of law.”119
The majority opinion in Bonte neatly illustrates a purely logical
approach to common law decision-making. Justice Thayer determined, first,
that precedent supported a cause of action by a child against a parent; and,
second, that precedent supported a cause of action for negligence for injuries
sustained in utero.120 Faced with a claim by a child for negligence against his
mother for injuries suffered while she was pregnant with him, Justice Thayer
concluded that this was simply a variation on specific actions the court had
already sanctioned in respect to the injury allegedly suffered and the potential
for a remedy.121 Justice Thayer’s reasoning may be (crudely) diagrammed
thus: (x1 + x2 = y), where x is a valid, previously-recognized cause of action.
But while this diagram illustrates the role of logic in consistent decisionmaking, it also shows that the Bonte majority’s perspective on the precedents
and the issues in the case could be seen as fairly reductive. In The Nature of
the Judicial Process, Cardozo warned that pure logic will take us only so
far.122 Some cases, for example, will present two plausible and logical paths,
requiring that we “make a choice between [logical paths].”123 And in other
cases, reliance upon logic may threaten to become an end unto itself,
blinding a judge to the other possibilities: “The misuse of logic . . . begins,”
Cardozo stated, “when its method and its ends are treated as supreme and
final.”124
Indeed, the dissenters in Bonte acknowledged the force of the majority’s
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 30–31.
Cardozo, supra note 1, at 31.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 36.
See Bonte, 616 A.2d at 466.
See id.
Cardozo, supra note 1, at 43.
Id.
Id. at 46.
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logic, but they nonetheless saw that path as leading to future problems—
namely, the possibility that “the day-to-day decisions and acts of a woman
concerning her pregnancy” could be subjected “to judicial scrutiny.”125 And
yet, in Aranson, Justice Batchelder—now writing for the majority—relied
upon the kind of formulaic logic employed in Bonte to conclude that the
court should embrace a new cause of action for malicious defense: if the only
remedy available to an aggrieved plaintiff were sanctions, he reasoned, and if
that remedy could not provide plaintiff a full recovery, and if damages were
available when a party was equally aggrieved by a malicious prosecution, it
followed that the court should adopt the tort of malicious defense.126 Here,
Justice Batchelder’s conclusion may be diagrammed thus: (x = y), where x is
an action for malicious prosecution and y an action for malicious defense.
This diagram of the reasoning in Aranson is no less reductive than the
diagram of Justice Thayer’s reasoning in Bonte; an examination of Cardozo’s
method of philosophy—the path of logic—has moved us no closer to
understanding how Justice Batchelder’s positions in Bonte and Aranson
could be viewed as consistent. Logical reasoning is a hallmark of
consistency and, therefore, judicial legitimacy, but, as Cardozo labored to
explain, it is not the sole means by which a judge determines which path the
law will follow. In the many cases in which logic proves inadequate to the
complexities of determining the law’s path, Cardozo argued that “[h]istory or
custom of social utility or some compelling sentiment of justice or sometimes
perhaps a semi-intuitive apprehension of the pervading spirit of our law must
come to the rescue of the anxious judge, and tell him where to go.”127
B. The Methods of History and Custom
History, Cardozo argued, may confine and direct the path of logic: “the
effect of history is to make the path of logic clear.”128 He meant that
“history, in illuminating the past, illuminates the present, and in illuminating
the present, illuminates the future.”129 What has come before, in other words,
may give a judge a good indication of whether a rule or set of rules has
proved adequate to the task for which it was designed, or whether a
modification is in order.
The method of history so understood, it seems clear that a resort to
history will not provide the connecting link between Justice Batchelder’s
positions in Bonte and Aranson. Recall that in each case, the plaintiff sought
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Bonte, 616 A.2d at 467 (Brock, C.J., and Batchelder, J., dissenting).
Aranson, 671 A.2d 1023, 1027 (N.H. 1995).
Cardozo, supra note 1, at 43.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 53.
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a rule that would allow a remedy for injuries allegedly suffered as a result of
certain actions by the defendant, and which presumably would deter such
injurious actions in the future. In Bonte, the dissenters denied that the
relevant history—the evolution in negligence law that came to allow both
actions by children against their parents and by children against third parties
for injuries suffered in utero—was apposite. 130 Indeed, they argued
essentially that this history revealed nothing about the potential consequences
of exposing women to potential liability to their own children while they are
in utero.131
In Aranson, by contrast, Justice Batchelder relied upon the historically
favorable experience with the tort of malicious prosecution to bolster the
argument for adopting the tort of malicious defense. 132 Given that the
wronged party is similarly aggrieved in each instance, he saw no reason why
liability should not exist for the wrong of malicious defense just as it does for
malicious prosecution.133 To the extent Justice Batchelder’s positions in
Bonte and Aranson may be seen as consistent, it is not because he found the
path of history to be persuasive in each case: in one, he rejected favorable
history as essentially irrelevant; in the other, he embraced it.
“If,” Cardozo continued, “history and philosophy do not serve to fix the
direction of a principle, custom may step in.”134 But custom is less relevant
“in the making of new rules as in the application of old ones.”135 In both the
cases under discussion here, the court was concerned with the making of new
rules, and custom—the ways in which the rules have over time come to
work—provides little guidance in evaluating the consistency of Justice
Batchelder’s decisions in these cases.
C. The Method of Sociology
“The final cause of law,” Cardozo observed, “is the welfare of
society.”136 He continued:
Logic and history and custom have their place. We will
shape the law to conform to them when we may; but only
within bounds. The end which the law serves will dominate
them all. . . . [When judges] are called upon to say how far
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Bonte, 616 A.2d at 467.
Id.
Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1028.
Id. at 1029.
Cardozo, supra note 1, at 58.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 66.
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existing rules are to be extended or restricted, they must let
the welfare of society fix the path, its direction and its
distance.137
By “social welfare,” Cardozo meant, “what is commonly spoken of as
public policy, the good of the collective body.”138 Judges accordingly should
move away from “the conception of a lawsuit as either a mathematical
problem or a sportsman’s game,” and think “of the end which the law serves,
and fitting its rules to the task of service.”139 Within the limits of their
discretion, “within the range over which choice moves, the final principle of
selection for judges, as for legislators, is one of fitness to an end.”140
Still, judgments must be justified under “objective or external
standards,” lest they become “a jurisprudence of mere sentiment or
feeling.” 141 Objective principles ought to provide for “symmetrical
development” in the common law, consistent with “history or custom when
history or custom has been the motive force, or the chief one, in giving shape
to existing rules, and with logic or philosophy when the motive power has
been theirs.”142 “Symmetrical development,” however, “may be bought at
too high a price. Uniformity ceases to be a good when it becomes uniformity
of oppression. The social interest served by symmetry or certainty must then
be balanced against the social interest served by equity and fairness or other
elements of social welfare.”143
The problem is that judges must discern the point at which the interest
in symmetrical development becomes associated with “uniformity of
oppression.” Cardozo suggested that the judge will know “when one interest
outweighs another” from his or her “experience and study and reflection; in
brief, from life itself.”144 Cardozo had great faith in the abilities of judges:
“if they act with conscience and intelligence, they ought to attain in their
conclusions a fair average of truth and wisdom.”145
Here we have a method of judicial decision-making with which we can
attempt to reconcile Justice Batchelder’s positions in Bonte and Aranson: the
method of sociology, the directive to safeguard social justice when its value
would be denied by the operation of logic and history. Thus in Bonte the
dissenters could have viewed the logical creation of a cause of action for a
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 66–67.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 101–02.
Cardozo, supra note 1, at 103
Id. at 106.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 112–13.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 136.
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child against his mother for her negligent acts while he was in utero as
oppressive to women, potentially subjecting a mother’s every decision to
judicial scrutiny. And in Aranson, Justice Batchelder could have viewed the
creation of a cause of action for malicious defense as means by which to
prevent the oppression of plaintiffs who otherwise would have no recourse
against the malicious actions of defendants in litigation.
Notwithstanding Cardozo’s faith in the intelligence and conscience of
judges, this reconciliation of Justice Batchelder’s positions in Bonte and
Aranson depends upon agreement with an unspecified notion of social
justice. Notably, the state constitution itself, in Part I, article 14, supplied the
court and the litigants in these cases with a quite specific notion of social
justice—that every citizen shall have “a certain remedy, by having recourse
to the laws, for all injuries he may receive in his person, property, or
character.”146 A conscientious judge, seeking to achieve social justice in
these cases and aware of the outermost limits on a judge’s ability to
innovate,147 need look no further: in addition to the logic and history of
precedent, Part I, Article 14 suggests that the end of social justice may be
secured through the provision in the common law of remedies for injuries,
which in each of these cases would have warranted the recognition of a new
cause of action.
And so Justice Batchelder’s decisions in Bonte and Aranson still appear
to point in different directions. Is it possible to explain the apparently
inconsistent regard for the premise of Article 14 in each? Perhaps Justice
Batchelder recognized the import of the constitutional promise of a remedy
for all injuries in Aranson, but not in Bonte, because he (along with Chief
Justice Brock) saw the potential for oppression in lawsuits by children
against their mothers for injuries suffered from her negligence while they
were in utero as a greater injustice than the lack of a remedy for children in
that situation. In this light, Justice Batchelder’s position in Bonte could be
viewed as idiosyncratic—as a product of the peculiar facts of the case—and
yet just, in the sense that the potential harm to women outweighed the
plaintiff child’s competing interest.
Whether it would have satisfied Cardozo, this explanation might not save
Justice Batchelder from the charge that his position in Bonte was motivated
by a personal philosophical objection to the majority’s conclusion. Why, for
instance, should the interest in protecting mothers be accorded greater weight
than the interest in providing a remedy for their children? As a general
matter, moreover, we should prefer that decisions in similar cases involving
146. N.H. CONST. pt.1, art. XIV.
147. After all, as Cardozo put it, “[t]he cells in which there is motion do not change the
proportions of the mass.” Cardozo, supra note 1, at 136.
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similar claims be reconciled—if at all possible—for in such consistency lies
not just a sound basis for viewing judicial lawmaking as legitimate, but
guidance for lawyers and judges wrestling with similar issues in the future.
In respect to Bonte and Aranson, logic, history, and sociology do not, either
alone or together, get us there. But accounting for the potential influence of
other constitutional concerns—that is, concerns beyond Article 14—just
might, as I explain in the next Part.
III. ACCOUNTING FOR CONSTITUTIONAL SHADOWS
As noted above, Part I, Article 14 of the New Hampshire Constitution
guarantees to each individual “a certain remedy, by having recourse to the
laws, for all injuries he may receive in his person, property, or character.”148
This commitment has been interpreted by the New Hampshire Supreme
Court as serving two purposes: “to make civil remedies readily available, and
to guard against arbitrary and discriminatory infringement on access to the
courts.”149 The court has held that these rights “are necessarily relative,”150
and that Article 14 “does not guarantee that all infringed persons will receive
full compensation for their injuries.”151
By its terms, Article 14 does not compel the courts of New Hampshire
to create new causes of action upon request.152 But, as discussed above, it
does give a constitutional imprimatur to a particular social justice value—
namely, the value in providing at least an opportunity for individuals to
demonstrate they are entitled to a remedy for injuries they have suffered. In
a much earlier case, Justice Batchelder noted that the law has long
“endeavored to provide rational remedies to those persons whose lot in life
has taken a detrimental turn as a result of the conduct of others who have
breached a duty owed to the injured party.”153
Thus Article 14 casts a distinct shadow on the judicial determination
whether to create a new cause of action. To be clear, this is not the “shadow
of the law” that necessarily influences the strategic behavior of parties in
litigation to push for either settlement or trial.154 It is, rather, a constitutional
marker, one that suggests that, in appropriate cases, a court should consider
the implications of leaving individuals without an opportunity to seek a
148. N.H. CONST., pt. 1, art. XIV.
149. Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester, 406 A.2d 704, 706 (N.H. 1979).
150. Sousa v. State, 341 A.2d 282, 284 (N.H. 1975).
151. Cargill, 406 A.2d at 706.
152. See id. (noting that, in the face of compelling public policy reasons, the victims of
negligence may be barred from recovery).
153. Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003, 1004 (N.H. 1982).
154. See Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982).
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remedy. As Justice Batchelder observed in Aranson, a court ought to “keep
in mind”155 Article 14 when it considers whether to recognize a plaintiff’s
interest in relief and whether the relief requested would be appropriate.156
Justice Batchelder’s decision in Aranson expressly reflects the impulse
to “keep in mind” Article 14’s mandate. Nonetheless, as discussed above,
Article 14’s shadow does not, in itself, provide the key to reconciling his
positions in Bonte and Aranson, for that shadow leans in just one direction:
toward the path favoring judicial recognition of a legitimate need for the
common law to provide individuals a remedy. In Bonte, of course, Justice
Batchelder and Chief Justice Brock criticized their colleagues in the majority
for following this very path.157
But in Bonte, unlike in Aranson, Article 14 was not the only
constitutional provision to cast a shadow on the determination whether to
recognize a new cause of action. A constitution, after all, will often embrace
numerous values of differing dimensions, some of which may be in tension
with others. Once we accept the possibility that a court, in deciding whether
to recognize a new action, may need to account for both the value that
inheres in the availability of a remedy and another, competing value, the way
is made clear to see the consistency in Justice Batchelder’s decisions in
Bonte and Aranson. Indeed, on this view, the difference between the
decisions comes down to one fact: the shadow over the determination in
Bonte cast by another, arguably superior constitutional value.158
Recall that, in their dissenting opinion in Bonte, Chief Justice Brock and
Justice Batchelder criticized the majority for discounting “the problems
associated with legally recognizing a mother’s duty to her fetus,” and
questioned whether it was “possible to subject a woman’s judgment, action,
and behavior as they relate to the well-being of her fetus to a judicial
determination of reasonableness in a manner that is consistent and free from
arbitrary results.”159 They explained that the nature and scope of the duty
recognized by the majority would involve extensive “after-the-fact judicial
scrutiny of the subtle and complicated factors affecting a woman’s
pregnancy,” scrutiny that could “make life for women who are pregnant or
who are merely contemplating pregnancy intolerable.”160 For these reasons,
the dissenters believed the duty of a mother to her unborn child should
155. 671 A.2d at 1026.
156. See id.
157. See Bonte, 616 A.2d at 468 (Brock, C.J., and Batchelder, J., dissenting).
158. To put the point into Dworkinian terms, shadow-casting constitutional values represent
principles of law which judges “must take into account, if [they are] relevant, as a
consideration inclining in one direction or another.” Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules,
35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 26 (1967).
159. Bonte, 616 A.2d at 468 (Brock, C.J., and Batchelder, J., dissenting).
160. Id.
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“remain a moral obligation which, for the vast majority of women, is already
freely recognized and respected without compulsion by law.”161
The dissenters did not explore in detail the pedigree of the “privacy
interests” 162 they argued would be undermined by the majority’s newlycreated duty to the unborn child, but it requires no great stretch to connect
these interests to the individual autonomy rights protected under the United
States Constitution. Indeed, the New Hampshire Supreme Court decided
Bonte just months after the United States Supreme Court issued its decision
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 163 in which it reaffirmed the core
constitutional principles recognized in Roe v. Wade. 164 In Casey, the
plurality opinion made clear that the U.S. Constitution has long protected,
and would continue to protect, “a realm of personal liberty which the
government may not enter,”165 a realm which includes aspects of individual
and intimate decision-making regarding procreation, family, and parenthood,
and which includes a woman’s right to choose.166
The constitutional implications of the rule adopted by the Bonte
majority might have been more apparent had the state legislature enacted it.
In a challenge to such a law, a court would need to determine, as an initial
matter, whether the rule implicated a fundamental right, which would in turn
trigger some form of heightened judicial scrutiny.167 To this end, the court
would ask whether the asserted interest was “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and traditions, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.”168 The first
inquiry addresses the historical support the interest has received in American
law; the second seeks to ascertain whether, if this interest were not deemed to
be fundamental, the most basic sense of liberty in our constitutional republic
would be at risk.
What is the specific interest implicated by the Bonte majority’s rule? It
can be described as the freedom of a woman, during the course of her
pregnancy, to make without fear of sanction the innumerable everyday
decisions that potentially could affect her well-being or that of her unborn
child. These are decisions about such mundane matters as whether to drive
an automobile, or to ride a bicycle, or even to walk across a street. This kind
of decision-making ordinarily is subject only to generalized regulation—for
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 847.
See id. at 849 (recounting cases).
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-721 (1997).
Id. at 721.
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instance, the requirement that all drivers possess a valid license.169
Turning first to the nation’s history and legal traditions, it seems clear
that the common law regulation of pregnant women through the availability
of a negligence action is a relatively recent phenomenon.170 Further, there is
little evidence supporting the view that at the time of the framing of either
the U.S. Constitution in 1787 or the Fourteenth Amendment in 1867—much
less the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784—the unborn could bring a
civil suit against their mothers for the consequences of her negligent acts
during the course of the pregnancy. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in
Roe v. Wade, the text of the federal constitution does not suggest that the
unborn should be considered “persons” within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, much less that they are a specially protected class.171
Further, a woman’s interest in making everyday decisions about how
she will live her life could be seen as implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty. The autonomy to, for example, move about freely—to decide where
to go and how to get there, restricted only by the regulations that affect all
persons—would seem to be critical to the enjoyment of not just other
constitutional liberties, but to a woman’s ability to fulfill the obligations and
responsibilities of citizenship. The potential for civil liability could
effectively reduce the compass of a woman’s freedom during the course of
her pregnancy—the world, after all, is a dangerous place to negotiate on our
best days, and it is difficult (if not impossible) to foresee all the many ways
in which the many hazards of everyday life potentially could result in harm
to an unborn child.172 Regulation along the lines of the Bonte majority’s
negligence rule would represent at least a modest step toward the world of
Margaret Atwood’s novel, The Handmaid’s Tale, in which certain women
consigned by the ruling elite to serve as vessels for reproduction were
deprived the freedom to make decisions that might result in harm to the
children they were carrying.173
For these reasons, a court could well declare fundamental a woman’s
interest in the ability, free from fears about potential tort liability, to make
daily decisions while pregnant; such a conclusion would subject laws that
undermine this interest to something more intense than mere rational-basis
judicial scrutiny. This interest would be implicated regardless of whether the
169. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263:1 (“No person, except those expressly
exempted . . . shall drive any motor vehicle upon any way in this state unless such person has
a valid driver's license, as required under the provisions of this chapter, for the class or type of
vehicle being driven.”).
170. See Remy v. MacDonald, 801 N.E.2d 260, 264 (Mass. 2004) (discussing cases).
171. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157–58.
172. See Bonte, 616 A.2d at 468 (Brock, C.J., and Batchelder, J., dissenting) (noting the
myriad factual “circumstances and complexities of the factors at play”).
173. MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID’S TALE (1985).
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legislature or a court adopted a rule imposing liability on a woman for her
allegedly negligent decision-making while pregnant.
And so, like the value of a remedy embraced by Article 14, the
constitutional value that inheres in a woman’s “privacy interests” casts a
shadow in Bonte on the determination whether to recognize a new cause of
action, and the court must assess the influence of these respective shadows
on that question.174 On the one hand, the Bonte majority’s rule creates the
potential for regulation, which could over time operate to diminish the
autonomy of a percentage of the state’s female population for a portion of
their lives. On the other, a child has a legitimate interest in compensation for
prenatal harms inflicted by a mother’s negligence. Of course, as the Bonte
dissenters noted, even absent a cause of action compelling her to act, the duty
of a mother to her child “remains a moral obligation which, for the vast
majority of women, is already freely recognized.”175 On balance, the Bonte
dissenters reasonably could have concluded that the shadow created by the
value of a woman’s autonomy is sufficiently deep that it, and not the value of
a remedy, ought to bear more immediately on the determination whether to
declare a new common law cause of action. At a minimum, the federal
precedent supporting the validity of a woman’s interest in autonomous
decision-making provides an explanation for the Bonte dissenters’ objection
to a new cause of action that rests on a ground more legitimate than that of
personal philosophical preference.
As this discussion indicates, the court in Aranson did not have to address
a tension between competing values—in other words, there was no
constitutional interest against which the Aranson court had to balance the
plaintiff’s request for a remedy for having allegedly suffered a malicious
defense. In that case, Justice Batchelder could acknowledge the shadow cast
by Article 14 and, as he once counseled, “keep in mind”176 the provision’s
promise of “a certain remedy . . . for all injuries.”177
That the presence of a second and arguably deeper constitutional shadow
in Bonte allows us to reconcile that case and Aranson is supported by
another, earlier decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, one also
written by Justice Batchelder. In Kingsbury v. Smith, the court addressed the
question whether New Hampshire recognizes a claim for “wrongful birth.”178
Justice Batchelder construed this claim as one for “‘wrongful conception,’
which is an action for damages arising from the birth of a child to which a
174. Cf. Dworkin, supra note 158, at 27 (suggesting that, when principles intersect, “one
who must resolve the conflict has to take into account the relative weight of each”).
175. Bonte, 616 A.2d at 468 (Brock, C.J., and Batchelder, J., dissenting).
176. Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1026.
177. N.H. CONST., pt. I, art. XIV.
178. 442 A.2d 1003, 1004 (N.H. 1982).
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negligently performed sterilization procedure, or a negligently filled birth
control prescription which fails to prevent conception, was a contributing
factor.” 179 His opinion for the court concluded that, assuming all the
elements of a medical malpractice claim were present, the common law of
New Hampshire would permit such an action.180
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Batchelder reasoned that nonrecognition of this action would “leave[] a void in the area of recovery for
medical malpractice and dilute[] the standard of professional conduct and
expertise in the area of family planning.”181 He was bolstered in this view by
the fact that family planning decisions have been “clothed with constitutional
protection,” 182 citing, among other cases, Roe v. Wade and Griswold v.
Connecticut,183 in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that substantive due
process protects certain kinds of intimate decision-making from government
intrusion absent the most compelling interest.
Kingsbury makes clear the consistency between Justice Batchelder’s
decisions in Bonte and Aranson. The connecting link is the relationship
between the constitutional shadows at play in each case. In Kingsbury, there
was no tension between the value of a remedy promoted by Article 14 and
the constitutional protection afforded procreative decision-making, for an
action for wrongful conception could serve that autonomy interest by
potentially deterring its private infringement. In Bonte, however, the
recognition of an unborn child’s claim against her mother for her negligent
acts while she was pregnant was in tension with a woman’s interest in
autonomous decision-making, requiring the court to determine which
constitutional value should prevail. Finally, in Aranson, there was no tension
between Article 14’s promise of a remedy and any another constitutional
interest, so Justice Batchelder could focus his analysis upon the standard
considerations that go into determining whether to recognize a new common
law claim.
CONCLUSION
Consistency provides some assurance that particular outcomes of
judicial lawmaking will be predictable and not arbitrary. The goal of this
essay was simply to see whether we could find some consistency between
Justice Batchelder’s decisions in Bonte v. Bonte and Aranson v. Schroeder,
where differing outcomes in what appeared to be similar situations appeared
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. (citations omitted).
See id. at 1005.
Id.
Id. at 1005–06.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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to suggest the results flowed more from personal philosophy than reasoned
legal analysis. The key to reconciling the decisions lay in untangling the
shadows cast by certain constitutional commitments on the judicial
determination whether to recognize a new cause of action. The rule of
decision that emerges from this analysis allows us to both reconcile Justice
Batchelder’s decisions in Bonte and Aranson and find some guidance in that
reconciliation for future cases.
That rule of decision requires an initial judicial inquiry into the
constitutional implications of adopting a new cause of action. Article 14
supports, as a matter of state constitutional law, the creation of just remedies
for injuries suffered; as an initial matter, a court must determine whether this
value is in tension with another, settled constitutional interest. Should such a
tension be discovered, the Bonte dissent suggests it ought to be considered
and resolved as a part of its determination whether to expand the common
law and embrace the new claim. When, on the other hand, such a tension
does not exist, Aranson suggests the court should focus exclusively on the
traditional concern of judicial lawmaking in this context—that is, whether the
common law should “provide rational remedies to those persons whose lot in
life has taken a detrimental turn as the result of the conduct of others.”184
***
In addition to his work on the bench, Justice Batchelder kept a small
farm in his native Plymouth; there his wife tended to the sheep and he the
fields littered with the stones that comprise many New England walls.185
These stones found their way into his judicial writing; in one decision, he
compared public policy to “Robert Frost’s stone wall,” which could be
viewed “with a purpose to determine what claims are walled in and what
claims are walled out.”186
Given his fondness for New England’s stone walls, Justice Batchelder
likely would have appreciated this guidance from a stonemason, as recounted
by the writer John Jerome:
Once I left a stone unstable, rocking on a high spot. She
spotted it immediately. “I don’t like that and neither do
you,” she said, pulling it down, turning it over, giving its
underside a couple of good whacks with hammer and chisel,
and plopping it firmly and securely in its place.187
184. Kingsbury, 442 A.2d at 1004.
185. See Murphy, supra note 7, at 8 (noting that “[Justice Batchelder’s wife] Betty does the
farming; Bill talks about it”).
186. Welzenbach v. Powers, 660 A.2d 1133, 1135 (N.H. 1995).
187. JOHN JEROME, STONE WORK 56 (1989).

28

UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 12, No. 1

As Justice Batchelder’s decisions in Bonte and Aranson demonstrate,
common law decision-making is not entirely unlike stone work: for what are
the judges doing but pulling out a proposed cause of action, turning it over
and giving it some shape, so that it fits “firmly and securely in its place”—or
concluding, upon close inspection of the ways in which constitutional
shadows fall upon it, that this action will ultimately prove unstable, leaving
the law “rocking on a high spot”?

